Pragmatic public choices

Abstract

Supported by the concept of administrative legality, as defined by Paolo Otero, and the understanding of pragmatism derived from the theory described by Richard Posner, this research focuses on the limits of judicial and audit court oversight over public choices. Its specific objective is to present new paradigms in administrative law that establish a historic milestone for administrative efficiency. The issue addressed in this article encompasses incongruent external control aimed at the indiscriminate punishment of public managers. This matter warrants a thorough analysis, as it leads to the immobilization of administrative actions and, consequently, weakens the public machinery. As a result, the most vulnerable segment of society is no longer assisted by the State, putting the fulfillment of the existential minimum and human dignity at risk. Using a dialectical-descriptive methodology, the study aims to expose doctrinal concepts that denounce disproportionate control. In this context, the phenomena of the “pen blackout,” “administrative ossification,” and the practice of “organizational wrongdoing” are highlighted. This approach enables the identification of the harmful effects caused by the reduction of discretionary space and the suffocation provoked by dysfunctional control.